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POLLAK, District Judge. 
Jose Castro, a citizen of Costa Rica, challenges a 
determination by the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) 
that he is inadmissible under section 212(a)(6)(C)(ii) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”), 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii), which provides that “[a]ny alien who 
falsely represents, or has falsely represented, himself or 
herself to be a citizen of the United States for any purpose or 
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benefit under this chapter (including section 1324a of this 
title) or any other Federal or State law is inadmissible.”  We 
conclude that the statute does not apply to Castro’s conduct, 
and we therefore reverse and remand to the BIA. 
I. Administrative Proceedings 
Castro has lived in the United States since entering the 
country on a visitor’s visa in 1980, when he was twenty years 
old.  In 1989, he married Alma Rangel, who became a U.S. 
citizen by naturalization in 1997.  Castro and Rangel have one 
child, born in New Jersey in 1990. 
A. Adjustment of Status Application 
In 2006, Castro filed an application to adjust his status 
to permanent residence based on his marriage to Rangel.  
During his interview with the Department of Homeland 
Security (“DHS”) on his adjustment application, Castro 
disclosed that he had been arrested in 2004.  At DHS’s 
request, Castro provided DHS with a copy of the arrest report 
for this incident from the Paterson, New Jersey, police 
department.  The arrest report showed that Castro was 
arrested on September 25, 2004, on a charge of violating N.J. 
Stat. Ann. § 2C:34-1.1(b).1
                                              
1 Under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:34-1.1(b), “[a] person commits a 
disorderly persons offense if he: (1) wanders, remains or 
prowls in a public place with the purpose of engaging in 
prostitution or promoting prostitution . . . and (2) engages in 
conduct that, under the circumstances, manifests a purpose to 
engage in prostitution or promoting prostitution . . . .”  
According to the brief narrative contained in the arrest report, 
Castro was arrested for “propositioning an undercover police 
  The arrest report listed Castro’s 
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place of birth as “Puerto Rico.”  Castro also provided DHS 
with documentation showing that he had resolved the charge 
against him by pleading guilty to a disorderly conduct 
municipal offense. 
DHS concluded, based on the arrest report, that Castro 
had falsely claimed to be from Puerto Rico rather than Costa 
Rica at the time of his arrest.  In the agency’s view, this 
triggered the bar to admissibility contained in 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii).  On the basis of its inadmissibility 
determination, DHS concluded that Castro was ineligible for 
adjustment of status to permanent residence.2
B. Immigration Court Proceedings 
  DHS notified 
Castro on September 5, 2006, that his application for 
adjustment of status had been denied and that he could be 
subject to removal proceedings if he failed to depart from the 
country voluntarily. 
On February 28, 2007, DHS initiated removal 
proceedings against Castro on the basis of 8 U.S.C. 
                                                                                                     
officer . . . for sexual activity in exchange for something of an 
economical value, to wit: $10.00 [for] oral sex.” 
 
2 An applicant for adjustment of status is “assimilated” to the 
position of an individual seeking entry as an immigrant from 
outside the United States.  See, e.g., Jankowski-Burczyk v. 
INS, 291 F.3d 172, 175 n.2 (2d Cir. 2002); Matter of 
Rainford, 20 I. & N. Dec. 598, 601 (BIA 1992).  Thus, Castro 
could not be eligible for adjustment of status unless he was 
admissible to the country at the time of his application. 
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§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii).3
In the Immigration Court, Castro pursued two forms of 
relief from removal: first, he renewed his previously filed 
application for adjustment of status to permanent residence; 
second, he applied for cancellation of removal under INA 
§ 240A(b), 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b).
  DHS later added a charge that Castro 
was removable because he had overstayed his visa.  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1227(a)(1)(B).  Castro conceded that he was removable for 
having overstayed his visa, but he denied that 
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii) applied to him. 
4
                                              
3 DHS notified Castro that he was “subject to removal” 
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii).  That citation 
appears to be a mistake: § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii) makes an alien 
inadmissible, but not removable.  A separate provision, 8 
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(3)(D)(i), mirrors the language of 
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii) and makes a false claim of citizenship “for 
any purpose or benefit under this chapter (including section 
1324a of this title) or any Federal or State law” an 
independent ground for removal, but DHS did not invoke that 
provision in Castro’s case. 
  The Immigration Judge 
 
4 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1) provides: 
 
The Attorney General may cancel removal of, 
and adjust to the status of an alien lawfully 
admitted for permanent residence, an alien who 
is inadmissible or deportable from the United 
States if the alien— 
 
(A) has been physically present in the 
United States for a continuous 
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(“IJ”) held a hearing on Castro’s case on March 4, 2008.  At 
the outset of the hearing, Castro’s counsel observed that he 
had not yet received the entire administrative record from 
DHS.  That prompted the IJ to ask Castro’s counsel whether 
counsel would like time to review the entire administrative 
file.  Castro’s counsel declined, stating, “I don’t think there’s 
anything else relevant regarding the adjustment in the 
administrative package.” 
Two witnesses testified at the hearing: Castro and 
Detective William Palomino, the Paterson police officer who 
arrested Castro and filled out the arrest report.  They gave 
contrasting accounts of Castro’s statements after the arrest. 
                                                                                                     
period of not less than 10 years 
immediately preceding the date of 
such application; 
 
(B) has been a person of good moral 
character during such period; 
 
(C) has not been convicted of an 
offense under section 1182(a)(2), 
1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(3) of this 
title, subject to paragraph (5); and 
 
(D) establishes that removal would 
result in exceptional and 
extremely unusual hardship to the 
alien’s spouse, parent, or child, 
who is a citizen of the United 
States or an alien lawfully 
admitted for permanent residence. 
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Palomino testified that Castro provided him with the 
information about Castro’s place of birth that Palomino 
entered on the arrest report.  He further testified that he spoke 
Spanish and that there was no chance that he could have 
misunderstood “Costa Rica” as “Puerto Rico.”  On cross-
examination, Castro’s counsel asked Palomino a series of 
questions about the arrest report: 
Q. Okay, so basically your only recall of 
this [arrest], and it’s admittedly over 
three years ago, is from your police 
arrest report? 
A. Correct. 
. . . . 
Q. Looking at your arrest report again, 
there’s several things that are not filled 
in.  Why did you not fill in his social 
security number? 
A.  He, he didn’t give me one. 
 . . . . 
Q. And, if he didn’t give you a social 
security number wouldn’t that lead you 
to believe that he may not be a United 
States citizen? 
A. He didn’t know his, not necessarily.  He 
didn’t know his, he didn’t know his 
social security number.  A lot of people 
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don’t know their social security number 
at the time when we arrest them. 
. . . . 
Q. Do you see that box where it says U.S. 
citizen, yes or no, officer? 
A. Yes, I do. 
Q. And, how come there’s nothing checked 
there? 
A. I don’t know, sir. 
In addition to the arrest report, DHS submitted to the IJ 
a second document relating to the same incident, entitled “jail 
arrest card.”  On the jail arrest card, the question “U.S. 
Citizen?” had been marked “Y.”  Castro’s counsel also 
questioned Palomino about the jail arrest card: 
Q. [D]o you know who fills out the [jail] 
arrest card? 
A.  No, sir. 
Q. Okay. 
A. Whoever the officer is [who] is assigned 
to cellblock, he usually fills it out, but I 
don’t know. 
Palomino also testified about the procedure by which 
he handled Castro’s case: 
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Q. Okay, would Mr. Castro saying he was a 
United States citizen or citizen of Costa 
Rica [have] made any difference 
regarding your procedure in handling 
this matter? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. So there was no benefit gain[ed] by Mr. 
Castro saying he was from Puerto Rico? 
. . . . 
A. No, there’s no gain. 
. . . . 
Q. Okay, and would you treat him any 
differently if he was incarcerated as a 
person from Puerto Rico or Costa Rica? 
A. No, sir. 
. . . . 
Q. In your practice and procedure in how 
you arrest people and how you act, 
would it make a difference where a 
person is from to what your job is? 
A. No, sir. 
Q. Okay, so you would have arrested him 
regardless of his country and you would 
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have detained him and sent him to jail 
regardless of his country of birth? 
A. Yes, sir. 
After the conclusion of Palomino’s testimony, Castro 
took the stand.  Castro testified that he told Palomino that he 
was born in “Costa Rica.”  He explained that, at the time of 
his arrest, “we were two people in the car and the other guy 
was Puerto Rican.”  As to the jail arrest card, Castro stated 
that he volunteered his driver’s license at the jail but that he 
did not provide any additional personal information. 
Castro also testified that he first saw the arrest report 
on “the second day after I was arrested” and that he returned 
to the police station to tell an officer that “the report was 
incorrect.”  When the IJ asked Castro why he went back to 
the police, Castro answered “because my wife read [the arrest 
report] and told me that it was incorrect.”  Castro explained 
that he was about to submit his application for adjustment of 
status to permanent residence and that he was concerned that 
“what was being said in the report was erroneous.”  Castro 
testified that when the police officer told him that the error as 
to his place of birth “was not a problem,” Castro explained to 
the officer that “yes that was a problem because automatically 
they will send me back to my country and I’d been here in 
this country many years.” 
At the conclusion of the March 4, 2008, hearing, the IJ 
issued an oral opinion accompanied by a written summary.  
The IJ credited Palomino’s testimony that Castro gave his 
place of birth as Puerto Rico.  From this, the IJ inferred that 
Castro had made a false claim to U.S. citizenship. 
11 
The IJ further concluded that Castro had falsely 
claimed to be a U.S. citizen for a “purpose or benefit under 
. . . Federal or State law,” within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii).  He explained his reasoning as follows: 
This is the more difficult issue.  Counsel 
claims there is some kind of case law.  There 
has been no brief by respondent’s counsel.  
There has been no specific Board case, other 
Circuit case, or 3rd Circuit case proffered here 
today.  And, we have as a factual matter, 
respondent’s own testimony here today that he 
knew the potential consequences because he 
was going to be applying for legal status in the 
United States. 
Now, I want to make it clear here the 
respondent indicated that, has already 
acknowledge[d] that he has no legal status.  So, 
it is clear to this Court that there is a direct 
benefit here for someone because if you have a 
crime, you may face some sort of legal 
consequences.  Counsel pointed out that this 
may alone not have been enough, but it goes to 
the issue of discretion and he chose, respondent 
chose not to be candid with his country of 
designation as the Court understood his 
testimony here today. 
Respondent further testified that his wife 
had a naturalization application pending and 
that this would have, may have had a 
deleterious impact on that for him as well.  So 
there you have a series of benefits.  You have 
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the benefit of someone who had no legal status 
and having an arrest come up.  You had 
someone who was in the process of filing for an 
adjustment of status, its impact therein is a 
matter of discretion and you have the wife 
seeking naturalization and the impact this would 
have on the naturalization process which 
respondent readily acknowledged. 
. . . . 
Therefore, I unfortunately find that the 
respondent did make a false claim to citizenship 
in an effort to obtain a benefit.  In this instance 
to stay in the United States. 
Because the IJ found Castro to be inadmissible under 8 
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii), he denied Castro’s application for 
adjustment of status.  Without stating his reasons for doing 
so, the IJ also denied Castro’s application for cancellation of 
removal.  Having thus denied both of Castro’s applications 
for relief from removal, the IJ ordered that Castro be removed 
to Costa Rica. 
C. Proceedings before the BIA 
1. Appeal of the Merits 
Castro’s counsel filed a notice of appeal with the BIA 
on April 4, 2008.  In the notice, the stated ground of appeal 
was that the IJ “improperly interpreted the law in finding that 
[Castro] made a false claim to U.S. citizenship in order to 
receive a legal benefit.” 
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Attached to the notice of appeal was a copy of a letter 
dated September 27, 2006, addressed to “The Attorney of 
Jose Castro” from Sergeant Thomas Trommelen of the 
Paterson police department.  In the letter, Trommelen stated, 
“I spoke with Det. Palomino who said it was possible Castro 
could have said Costa Rico [sic] as apposed [sic] to Puerto 
Rico when he asked him for his place of birth that night.”  
The notice of appeal made no reference to the attached letter, 
and no separate written brief was filed on Castro’s behalf 
with the BIA in support of the notice of appeal. 
On January 21, 2010, a three-judge panel of the BIA, 
one member dissenting, issued a decision affirming the IJ’s 
denial of Castro’s application for adjustment of status.  The 
BIA unanimously found no clear error in the IJ’s 
determination that Castro told Palomino that he was born in 
Puerto Rico.  The Board acknowledged receipt of 
Trommelen’s letter but declined to consider it because Castro 
“ha[d] not demonstrated that the letter, dated September 27, 
2006, was not available and could not have been discovered 
or presented in the 2008 hearing before the Immigration 
Judge.” 
A majority of the BIA panel also upheld the IJ’s 
determination that Castro’s statement that he had been born in 
Puerto Rico satisfied 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii).  The 
majority reasoned that Castro had made a false claim to U.S. 
citizenship for a “purpose or benefit under . . . Federal or 
State law,” within the meaning of § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii), 
because “inter alia, the respondent had no status in this 
country, and evidently feared being turned over to the 
Department of Homeland Security.”  BIA Member Patricia A. 
Cole dissented on this point, stating, “I do not find the section 
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212(a)(6)(C)(ii) of the Act charge to be sustained because the 
record does not establish that the respondent met the ‘purpose 
or benefit’ requirement for this charge.” 
Having upheld the IJ’s inadmissibility determination, 
the BIA dismissed Castro’s appeal, thereby sustaining the IJ’s 
order that Castro be removed to Costa Rica.  The BIA did not 
address the IJ’s denial of Castro’s application for cancellation 
of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b).5
2. Motion to Reconsider 
 
On February 22, 2010, Castro filed a motion to 
reconsider the BIA’s decision, arguing that the BIA erred in 
adopting the IJ’s application of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii).  
Castro maintained that he did not say that he was from Puerto 
Rico and, alternatively, that giving his place of birth as Puerto 
Rico would not satisfy § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii) under the 
circumstances.  Additionally, Castro argued that the failure of 
DHS to provide him with a copy of Trommelen’s letter 
violated due process. 
On June 28, 2010, the BIA denied Castro’s motion to 
reconsider its prior decision, concluding that Castro had not 
shown “any error of fact or law in that decision that would 
alter the outcome.”  Castro then filed the present petition for 
review of the BIA’s denial of his motion to reconsider. 
                                              
5 It would appear that inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii) does not result in ineligibility for 
cancellation of removal.  Matter of Guadarrama de 
Contreras, 24 I. & N. Dec. 625, 627 (BIA 2008).  However, 
Castro has not challenged the BIA’s silence on the 
cancellation-of-removal issue. 
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II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review 
A. Petition for Review of Denial of Reconsideration 
The scope of our jurisdiction is contested by the 
parties.  We review questions of our own jurisdiction de novo.  
Higgs v. Att’y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 337 (3d Cir. 2011). 
Castro filed a timely petition for review of the BIA’s 
June 28, 2010, order denying his motion to reconsider.  He 
did not file a petition for review of the BIA’s January 21, 
2010, decision on the merits of his administrative appeal.   
An adverse BIA decision on the merits (and 
accompanying order of removal) and a BIA order denying a 
motion to reconsider are “two separate final orders.”  Stone v. 
INS, 514 U.S. 386, 405 (1995).  Either one may be the subject 
of a petition for judicial review, which must be filed within 
thirty days of the date of the order.  8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), 
(b)(1).  As the government points out, filing a motion to 
reconsider does not toll the thirty-day period for seeking 
review of the earlier merits decision.  Stone, 514 U.S. at 398-
99; see also Khalil v. Att’y Gen., 309 F. App’x 624, 627 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 130 S. Ct. 188 (2009).  When judicial 
review is sought of both a BIA decision on the merits and a 
BIA decision on reconsideration, the two petitions for review 
must be consolidated and considered together.  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1252(b)(6).  But nothing prevents a petitioner from seeking 
review of only one of the two BIA orders.  See, e.g., Nocon v. 
INS, 789 F.2d 1028, 1033 (3d Cir. 1986) (only reviewing 
denial of motion to reconsider).  
The government contends that Castro’s decision to 
seek review of the BIA’s reconsideration decision, but not the 
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BIA’s earlier merits decision, curtails our jurisdiction to 
consider “the merits of his arguments against inadmissibility 
and removability.”  In the government’s view, these 
arguments are, in effect, an untimely appeal of the BIA’s 
earlier decision.  We disagree.  Some review of the merits 
decision is required in order to determine whether the BIA 
erred in concluding, on reconsideration, that Castro had not 
shown any error of fact or law in that decision that would 
alter the outcome. 
The BIA has described a motion for reconsideration as 
a “request that the Board reexamine its decision in light of 
additional legal arguments, a change of law, or perhaps an 
argument or aspect of the case which was overlooked.”  
Matter of Ramos, 23 I. & N. Dec. 336, 338 (BIA 2002); see 
also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(b)(1).  Thus, “[b]y its very nature, a 
motion for reconsideration alleges defects of some sort in the 
underlying decision by the BIA,” such that judicial review of 
the denial of a motion for reconsideration “ordinarily requires 
some review of the underlying decision.”  Esenwah v. 
Ashcroft, 378 F.3d 763, 765 (8th Cir. 2004); see also Narine 
v. Holder, 559 F.3d 246, 248-49 (4th Cir. 2009) (reviewing 
issues addressed in BIA’s merits decision on petition for 
review of BIA’s denial of motion to reconsider). 
We review a BIA denial of a motion to reconsider for 
abuse of discretion.  Pllumi v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 155, 158 
(3d Cir. 2011).  As a consequence, a petitioner who only 
seeks review of a BIA order on reconsideration forgoes any 
more favorable standard of review that might have applied 
had the petitioner sought review of the BIA’s underlying 
decision on the merits.  Esenwah, 378 F.3d at 765.  
Nevertheless, without some appraisal of the underlying 
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merits, it would not be possible for an appellate court to 
evaluate whether the BIA abused its discretion in denying a 
motion to reconsider the merits. 
The BIA abuses its discretion when it acts in a manner 
that is “arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to the law.”  Guo v. 
Ashcroft, 386 F.3d 556, 562 (3d Cir. 2004).  Questions of law 
are reviewed de novo, subject to any applicable administrative 
law canons of deference.  Fadiga v. Att’y Gen., 488 F.3d 142, 
153-54 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Borges v. Gonzales, 402 F.3d 
398, 404 (3d Cir. 2005)). 
B. Exhaustion 
The government also argues that Castro’s failure to 
exhaust some of his claims presents a jurisdictional barrier to 
our review.  We may review a final order of the BIA “only if 
. . . the alien has exhausted all administrative remedies 
available to the alien as of right.”  8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1).  The 
exhaustion requirement attaches to each particular issue 
raised by the petitioner.  Lin v. Att’y Gen., 543 F.3d 114, 120 
& n.6 (3d Cir. 2008).  A petitioner’s failure to exhaust an 
issue by presenting it to the BIA deprives us of jurisdiction to 
consider that issue.  Id. at 120-21; Hua Wu v. Att’y Gen., 571 
F.3d 314, 317 (3d Cir. 2009). 
We agree that exhaustion presents a barrier to 
reviewing one issue that Castro raises for the first time in his 
briefing to this court: namely, that the arrest report and jail 
arrest card generated after his arrest should not have been 
admitted in his removal proceedings because the loitering law 
under which he was arrested was unconstitutional.  Castro 
never presented that issue to the IJ or to the BIA.  It is 
unexhausted, and we lack jurisdiction to consider it. 
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Castro duly exhausted his administrative remedies for 
the other two issues for which he now seeks judicial review.  
He challenged the applicability of 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii) throughout the administrative 
proceedings.  As to his due process argument, described 
below, Castro attached Trommelen’s letter to his notice of 
appeal, and his motion to reconsider framed DHS’s alleged 
failure to disclose Trommelen’s letter as a due process 
violation.  That was sufficient to “place the Board on notice” 
of the issue, which is all that is required for exhaustion.  Lin, 
543 F.3d at 121 (quoting Joseph v. Att’y Gen., 465 F.3d 123, 
126 (3d Cir. 2006)). 
III. Discussion 
A. Due Process 
In the removal context, due process requires that “an 
alien be provided with a full and fair hearing and a reasonable 
opportunity to present evidence.”  Romanishyn v. Att’y Gen., 
455 F.3d 175, 185 (3d Cir. 2006). 
Castro claims that this due process requirement was 
violated because DHS failed to produce Sergeant 
Trommelen’s letter.  In the letter, Trommelen stated that 
Palomino, the officer who arrested Castro, told Trommelen 
that “it was possible Castro could have said Costa Rico [sic] 
as apposed [sic] to Puerto Rico” when Palomino was filling 
out the arrest report generated after Castro’s 2004 prostitution 
arrest.  The impeachment value of the letter is obvious: 
Palomino testified at the hearing in Castro’s removal 
proceedings that it was not possible that he (Palomino) could 
have mistakenly heard “Puerto Rico” instead of “Costa Rica.” 
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But there was no lack of due process in this case.  The 
record shows that Castro had an opportunity to present the 
letter in the proceedings before the IJ.  The letter is dated 
September 27, 2006—five months prior to the initiation, on 
February 28, 2007, of Castro’s removal proceedings—and is 
addressed to Castro’s counsel.  Moreover, DHS made its file 
on Castro, which Castro alleges contained Trommelen’s 
letter, available for review at the outset of the hearing on 
March 4, 2008.  Castro’s counsel declined to review the file.  
It is apparent that if Castro was unaware of Trommelen’s 
letter at the time of his hearing, that was the fault of Castro’s 
counsel, not of DHS. 
B. Application of 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii) 
We turn finally to the application of 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii).  The BIA sustained the IJ’s determination 
that § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii) rendered Castro inadmissible and thus 
ineligible for adjustment of status to permanent residence, 
with the result that he was ordered removed to Costa Rica.  
Section 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii) provides in pertinent part that: 
Any alien who falsely represents, or has falsely 
represented, himself or herself to be a citizen of 
the United States for any purpose or benefit 
under this chapter (including section 1324a of 
this title) or any other Federal or State law is 
inadmissible. 
Section 1182 provides for a waiver by the Attorney General 
of inadmissibility based on other forms of misrepresentation, 
see 8 U.S.C. § 1182 (i)(1); by implication, the bar to 
admissibility in § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii) cannot be waived by the 
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Attorney General.  Pichardo v. INS, 216 F.3d 1198, 1201 & 
n.5 (9th Cir. 2000). 
To avoid this unwaivable bar, Castro challenges the 
BIA’s factual determination that he stated that he was born in 
Puerto Rico and, in the alternative, the BIA’s legal conclusion 
that falsely giving his place of birth as Puerto Rico would 
satisfy the statute under the circumstances. 
 1. Factual Challenge 
Castro maintains that he told Palomino that he was 
born in Costa Rica rather than Puerto Rico, and that the IJ 
improperly credited Palomino’s testimony in reaching the 
opposite conclusion. 
The record, described in detail above, was mixed.  
Castro testified that he told Palomino that he was born in 
Costa Rica and that he tried to correct the arrest report after 
his wife noticed that the report said he was born in Puerto 
Rico.  Palomino testified that Castro said “Puerto Rico,” as 
recorded on the arrest report.  But Palomino also testified that 
he had no recollection of Castro’s arrest independent of the 
arrest report, and Castro offered, as a possible explanation for 
Palomino’s alleged mistake, the fact that the other man who 
was in the car with him when he was arrested was Puerto 
Rican.  Moreover, the portion of the arrest report which asked 
whether the arrestee was a U.S. citizen was left blank.  The 
record also contains a jail arrest card, which was marked “Y” 
for “U.S. Citizen?”  However, there was no testimony 
identifying the source of that information; Castro testified that 
he provided no personal information to the jail except his 
driver’s license. 
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The burden was on Castro to prove that he was 
admissible for permanent residence.  See 8 U.S.C. 
§§ 1229a(c)(2), 1255(a)(2).  A reasonable trier-of-fact could 
have concluded that Palomino’s testimony that Castro gave 
his place of birth as Puerto Rico, combined with the 
documentary evidence, was at least as credible as Castro’s 
testimony.  The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying 
Castro’s motion to reconsider on this ground. 
The credibility dispute between Palomino and Castro 
went to the question of whether Castro said that he was born 
in Puerto Rico.  Both the IJ and the BIA adopted the further 
inference that claiming to be born in Puerto Rico was 
tantamount to claiming to be a U.S. citizen.  Because persons 
who were born in Puerto Rico are, by and large, U.S. citizens, 
this inference was not improper.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1402. 
The BIA did not abuse its discretion when it denied 
Castro’s motion to reconsider the issue of whether Castro in 
fact claimed to be a citizen of the United States. 
2. Legal Challenge 
Section 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii) does not render inadmissible 
every alien who makes a false claim to United States 
citizenship.  Rather, the false claim must be made “for any 
purpose or benefit under this chapter (including section 1324a 
of this title) or any other Federal or State law.”  Castro argues 
that even if he told the Paterson police that he was born in 
Puerto Rico—a premise Castro contests but we have 
accepted—he did not do so for a “purpose or benefit” under a 
law within the meaning of the statute. 
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The BIA, one panel member dissenting, held that the 
“purpose or benefit” requirement of 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii) was met in Castro’s case because “inter 
alia, [he] had no status in this country, and evidently feared 
being turned over to the Department of Homeland Security.”  
The BIA did not explain which other purposes or benefits 
were intended by “inter alia.”  We assume this to be a 
reference to the reasoning of the IJ, and thus we turn to the 
IJ’s oral opinion.6
You have the benefit of someone who had no 
legal status and having an arrest come up.  You 
had someone who was in the process of filing 
for an adjustment of status, its impact therein is 
a matter of discretion and you have the wife 
seeking naturalization and the impact this would 
have on the naturalization process which 
respondent readily acknowledged. 
  That opinion, which we have already 
quoted at some length, referred to a “series of benefits”: 
Castro’s wife was not, in fact, seeking naturalization at the 
time; Castro was arrested in 2004, and the record shows that 
his wife became a naturalized citizen in 1997. 
Setting that error aside, we understand the BIA and the 
IJ to have concluded that Castro’s purpose in falsely stating 
that he was from Puerto Rico was to avoid the possibility that 
the Paterson police might report his arrest to DHS.  This 
                                              
6 When the BIA issues an opinion additional to the IJ’s 
opinion, we review the BIA’s decision and look to the IJ’s 
opinion “only insofar as the BIA defers to it.”  Huang v. Att’y 
Gen., 620 F.3d 372, 379 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 
23 
would have been to Castro’s benefit, according to the IJ, both 
because he was present in the country without legal status 
(and thus, the IJ presumed, wished to avoid any attention 
from DHS) and because he planned to apply for adjustment of 
status in the near future.7
There is scant record support for imputing this purpose 
to Castro.  Palomino testified that Castro gave his place of 
birth as Puerto Rico, but the officer did not speak to Castro’s 
purpose in doing so and specifically denied that Castro 
received any benefit by doing so.  Castro’s citizenship was 
 
                                              
7 Why the IJ thought that Castro would misrepresent his 
citizenship in order to benefit his future adjustment-of-status 
application is unclear.  As demonstrated by this case, a false 
claim of citizenship is problematic for an alien who plans to 
file an adjustment-of-status application.  In context, the IJ 
appears to have meant that Castro misrepresented his 
citizenship in an effort to ensure that DHS never learned of 
the arrest (though Castro gave his real name and other 
personal information to the police).  Ultimately, it was Castro 
who brought himself to the attention of DHS by applying for 
adjustment of status, and Castro who disclosed his arrest to 
DHS. 
The government also stresses that Castro had particular 
reason to avoid alerting DHS to an arrest for a prostitution 
offense.  An alien who procures or attempts to procure a 
prostitute may be inadmissible on that ground alone.  8 
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(D)(ii).  But that bar was not invoked in 
Castro’s case and would have applied—if at all—regardless 
of whether Castro was forthright with the Paterson police 
about his place of birth. 
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simply immaterial to the Paterson police.  There was no 
evidence that the Paterson police would have alerted DHS of 
Castro’s arrest had he given his place of birth as Costa Rica, 
and no evidence (other than what can be inferred from the 
false statement itself) that Castro thought the police would do 
so.  Castro testified that he intended to file an application for 
adjustment of status, but he offered this future application as a 
reason that he would not have given his place of birth as 
Puerto Rico.  At bottom, the BIA’s conclusion that Castro 
made a false claim of U.S. citizenship for the purpose of 
evading detection by immigration authorities seems to have 
been built solely on the assumption that this was a reasonable 
purpose to ascribe to Castro because he was undocumented. 
The purpose imputed by the BIA to Castro would 
apply to virtually any false claim of citizenship made by an 
individual unlawfully present in the country, since the 
absence of legal status always provides a reason to wish to 
avoid the attention of DHS.  That construction threatens to 
read the limiting language—the requirement that the “purpose 
or benefit” be “under this chapter (including section 1324a of 
this title) or any other Federal or State law”—out of the 
statute entirely.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii). 
The government argues that the BIA has found that 8 
U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii) “is broadly defined,” and that this 
construction is owed deference under either Chevron v. 
Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), or 
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).  “[B]roadly 
defined” is a phrase that the government quotes from Matter 
of Barcenas-Barrera, 25 I. & N. Dec. 40, 42 (BIA 2009), 
aff’d sub nom. Barcenas-Barrera v. Holder, 394 F. App’x 
100 (5th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1052 (2011).  In 
25 
that case, the respondent falsely represented herself to have 
been born in Texas on her application for a U.S. passport, and 
she had already been criminally convicted of willfully and 
knowingly making the false statement on her passport 
application.  Id.  In finding that a willful and knowing false 
claim of citizenship on a passport application satisfied 
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii), the BIA did not purport to offer a 
comprehensive interpretation of the “purpose or benefit” 
language of the statute.  The government points us to no other 
BIA interpretation of the relevant statutory language to which 
a court might be said to owe deference, and we are aware of 
none. 
The language of the statute is not amenable to the 
expansive reading the government urges upon us.  Section 
1182(a)(6)(C)(ii) applies by its terms only when the alien 
makes a false claim of U.S. citizenship for “any purpose or 
benefit under this chapter (including section 1324a of this 
title) or any other Federal or State law.”  The legislative 
history suggests that Congress intended the bar to apply to 
false citizenship claims made in conjunction with applications 
for private employment—the subject of the cross-referenced 
provision, 8 U.S.C. § 1324a, see infra note 9—as well as for 
public services and benefits.  The section was enacted as part 
of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant 
Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”), Pub. L. No. 104-208, 
div. C, tit. II, § 344(a), 110 Stat. 3009-546, 3009-637.  A 
chief purpose of the IIRIRA was “to improve deterrence of 
illegal immigration into the United States . . . by improving 
the verification system for the eligibility for employment.”  
H.R. Rep. No. 104-828, at 199 (1996) (Conf. Rep.).  The bill 
was also intended to address what its supporters perceived as 
“noncitizens’ abuse of the welfare system” through fraudulent 
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applications for public benefits.  142 Cong. Rec. 24,783 
(1996) (statement of Rep. Lamar Smith).8
The case law surrounding 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii) 
reflects those concerns.  As Matter of Barcenas-Barrera 
demonstrates, the provision has been applied when aliens 
make false claims of U.S. citizenship in applications for U.S. 
passports.  See also Muratoski v. Holder, 622 F.3d 824, 827-
29 (7th Cir. 2010); Rodriguez v. Gonzales, 451 F.3d 60, 65 
(2d Cir. 2006).  A false claim of U.S. citizenship made to 
obtain a U.S. passport is a false claim made for a “benefit 
under . . . Federal . . . law,” within the meaning of 
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii), because a passport is itself a legal benefit 
that facilitates its holder’s entry into the United States.  
Matter of Barcenas-Barrera, 25 I. & N. Dec. at 44.  
Similarly, the provision has been invoked in cases involving 
false claims of U.S. citizenship made orally or in writing to 
immigration officials for the purpose of gaining entry or 
  The author of the 
amendment that became § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii), Senator Alan 
Simpson, stated that the provision was intended as a 
“disincentive for falsely claiming citizenship” during the 
employment verification process.  142 Cong. Rec. 10,030 
(1996).   
                                              
8 See also Sandoval v. Holder, 641 F.3d 982, 985-86 (8th Cir. 
2011) (“Congress enacted [the IIRIRA] in 1996 out of 
concern about proliferation of fraud in accessing various 
federal benefits restricted to United States citizens or certain 
eligible non-citizens.”); Congressional Task Force on 
Immigration Reform, Report to the Speaker: The Honorable 
Newt Gingrich 33 (June 29, 1995) (describing “evidence of 
fraud committed by illegal aliens as a means to obtain public 
benefits”). 
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admission into the United States.  E.g., Valadez-Munoz v. 
Holder, 623 F.3d 1304, 1306-07, 1309 (9th Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied, 132 S. Ct. 106 (2011); Valenzuela-Solari v. Mukasey, 
551 F.3d 53, 54 (1st Cir. 2008).  As with a passport, it is 
relatively straightforward to view obtaining entry to the 
United States as a benefit under federal law, such that false 
claims of U.S. citizenship made to immigration authorities to 
obtain entry would satisfy § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii).  See Jamieson 
v. Gonzales, 424 F.3d 765, 768 (8th Cir. 2005).  And, finally, 
the provision has been invoked in the context of verifying a 
job applicant’s eligibility to work in the United States.  E.g., 
Kechkar v. Gonzales, 500 F.3d 1080, 1088-84 (10th Cir. 
2007); Naser v. Gonzales, 123 F. App’x 624, 624-25 (5th Cir. 
2005) (per curiam).  There is no question that 
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii) encompasses false claims of U.S. 
citizenship made during the employment eligibility 
verification process.9
                                              
9 “Section [1182(a)(6)(C)(ii)] dovetails to another part of the 
IIRIRA that established systems for verification of work 
authorization . . . designed to prevent unauthorized 
employment and loss of jobs to noncitizens.”  Sandoval, 641 
F.3d at 985.  Section 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii) specifically applies to 
false claims of U.S. citizenship made for a purpose or benefit 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1324a, which regulates the private 
employment of immigrants.  Among other things, § 1324a 
requires employers to verify employment eligibility using a 
form on which the employee “must attest, under penalty of 
perjury . . . that the individual is a citizen or national of the 
United States, an alien lawfully admitted for permanent 
residence, or an alien who is authorized by the Attorney 
General to be hired, recruited, or referred for such 
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With these precedents in mind, it is clear that the 
BIA’s construction of the “purpose or benefit” language was, 
in this instance, “unmoored from the purposes and concerns” 
of the statute.  Judulang v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 476, 490 
(2011).  In giving his place of birth, Castro was not seeking a 
public benefit from the Paterson police, in the sense of a 
benefit created by law and administered by the police.  The 
government stresses the potential adverse consequences of an 
arrest on Castro’s application for adjustment of status and his 
lack of legal status at the time of his arrest.  The various 
forms of relief from removal, including adjustment of status 
to permanent residence, would constitute “benefit[s] under 
. . . Federal . . . law” within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii).  However, these are legal benefits that 
would be conferred or withheld by DHS, not the Paterson 
police.   
At most, then, the “purpose or benefit” imputed by the 
BIA to Castro was to minimize the risk that the police would 
report his arrest to DHS.  Minimizing that risk is not, in and 
of itself, a legal benefit.  And, in fact, there was no risk.  
Palomino’s testimony made clear that the Paterson police 
routine had no interest in Castro’s citizenship status.   
                                                                                                     
employment.”  8 U.S.C. § 1324a(b)(2).  Under § 1324a(b)(3), 
employers must retain a version of the employment eligibility 
verification form and make it available for inspection by 
federal government authorities upon request.  Employers who 
fail to comply with § 1324a’s documentation requirements 
are subject to civil penalties under § 1324a(e)(5).  In effect, 
§ 1324a makes employers the front line in the enforcement of 
federal laws governing employment eligibility. 
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Our assurance that 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii) does 
not embrace a false statement such as the one made by Castro 
is confirmed by a review of the only two published cases 
which, to our knowledge, address applications of the statute 
outside of the contexts discussed above (i.e., passport 
applications, border entry, or employment eligibility 
verification).  In Dwumaah v. Attorney General, 609 F.3d 
586, 589 (3d Cir. 2010) (per curiam), this court upheld the 
BIA’s determination that an individual was removable for 
falsely claiming to be a U.S. citizen on an application for a 
federal student loan.  U.S. citizens are eligible for federal 
student loans, whereas undocumented immigrants are not.  20 
U.S.C. § 1091(a)(5).  By contrast, in Hassan v. Holder, 604 
F.3d 915, 928-29 (6th Cir. 2010), the Sixth Circuit held that 
the government had not established that a false claim to U.S. 
citizenship made on a Small Business Administration 
(“SBA”) loan application was made for a “purpose or benefit” 
under a federal law.  The applicant’s immigration status was 
irrelevant to the loan application, and no evidence suggested 
that the applicant believed that claiming to be a U.S. citizen 
would raise the probability that his application would be 
approved. 
Hassan and Dwumaah both involve applications for 
legal benefits in the form of publicly supported loans.  The 
difference in the two cases is the relevance of the applicant’s 
citizenship status.  In Dwumaah, being a U.S. citizen was a 
prerequisite to obtaining the student loan; in Hassan, being a 
U.S. citizen was immaterial to obtaining the SBA loan.  
Castro’s statement that he had been born in Puerto Rico is, in 
this respect, indistinguishable from the statement in Hassan.  
Palomino testified that Castro’s citizenship status had no 
bearing on the police department’s handling of his arrest.  
30 
And the Paterson police department had no authority to 
confer a legal benefit on Castro by virtue of his citizenship 
status. 
We do not purport to lay down an exhaustive 
interpretation of the circumstances to which 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii) might apply.  We rule only that the statute 
did not apply to the facts of record here.  Accordingly, we 
find that the BIA’s construction of the statute was contrary to 
law, and the BIA abused its discretion in denying Castro’s 
motion to reconsider its decision on this ground. 
III. Conclusion 
For the reasons stated above, we will grant the petition 
for review and remand to the BIA for further proceedings 
consistent with this opinion.  See INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 
16-17 (2002). 
